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Factor and Product Market
Tradability and Equilibrium in
Pacific Rim Pork Industries
Christopher B. Barrett, Jau Rong Li,
and DeeVon  Bailey
This study uses a new market analysis methodology  to examine  price and trade
relationships in eight Pacific Rim factor and product markets central to the Can-
adian and U.S. pork industries. The new method enables direct estimation of the
frequencies with which a variety of market conditions occur, including competitive
equilibrium, tradability,  and segmented  equilibrium.  While extraordinary profit
opportunities emerge episodically in a few niche markets, the vast majority of the
markets studied are highly competitive-exhibiting zero estimated marginal profits
to spatial arbitrage at monthly frequency-and internationally contestable. With
a few notable exceptions due primarily to nontariffbarriers, and despite significant
remaining tariffs in some niches, the Pacific Rim is effectively a single market for
pork producers  and processors today.
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Introduction
Ongoing  structural shifts in the North American pork industry raise important ques-
tions regarding the nature of international hog, feed, and pork markets. Canadian and
United States pork production and processing are both increasingly industrialized, and
each nation is now a net pork exporter. Since the gains in international competitiveness
for Canadian and U.S. pork producers and processors  seem increasingly likely to come
from lowering unit costs through exploitation of emerging economies of scale (Houghton),
the definition and development of accessible markets is central to the long-term health
of the industry in both countries. And because the biggest pork markets and the fastest
growth in consumption and trade are found in the Pacific Rim countries  of Asia and
North America, this region is of particular interest to Canadian and U.S.  suppliers,
helping prompt significant expansion of processing capacity in western North America
(Hayenga et al.). In this analysis, we therefore  study price and trade relationships in
feed, hog, and pork markets among the major Pacific pork economies.
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Economists and industry and government decision makers commonly want to know
whether two spatially separate markets are "integrated," and there is a substantial lit-
erature in economics (perhaps especially in agricultural economics) on such spatial price
analysis. Yet in the past few years, a number of studies have  shown that prevailing
market integration testing methods based on price analysis-e.g., correlation coefficients,
Granger causality, cointegration, or error correction mechanisms which relate prices in
one market to prices in another-are unreliable under a variety of conditions because
they rely on strong, often unrealistic, assumptions about trading behavior and the costs
of commerce. When trade is discontinuous  or bidirectional, or when transactions costs
are considerable  or nonstationary,  these methods 1 uniformly fail to be able to distin-
guish between rejection of the null economic hypothesis  of spatial market equilibrium
and  rejection  of the  assumptions  underpinning  model  specification  (Dahlgran  and
Blank; Barrett 1996,1999; McNew; Baulch; McNew and Fackler; Fackler and  FackFac  aGoodwin).
Such conditions are common in the face of intra-industry trade due to economies of scale
and product differentiation, seasonality in demand and supply, and trade policy reforms
and technological change in shipping, storage, and communications. And as we demon-
strate below, such conditions prevail in the Pacific Rim markets we study.
The challenge then facing economists is how to proceed with market analysis in the
face  of weaknesses  in existing  empirical  methods.  There have  been several notable
innovations in recent years, and this study applies the most recent of these to the case
of Pacific Rim pork industry markets.  Baulch introduced  a novel approach to market
integration testing which he labeled the parity bounds model (PBM). Baulch's PBM uses
both price and shipping cost data in maximum-likelihood  estimation of a model that
relaxes several untenable assumptions underpinning traditional price analysis, specifi-
cally the problems  of discontinuous  trade and nontrivial  costs  of commerce.  But as
applied by Baulch, PBM still falls prey to problems of nonstationary transactions costs
and bidirectional trade. Moreover, as Barrett (1996) argues, failure to take advantage
of the information available in trade flow data still limits the inferential capacity of the
parity bounds model.
Li  and Barrett,  building  on Baulch's  PBM,  introduce what  appears to be  the first
method to exploit information on prices, trade volumes, and intermarket marketing costs.
The Li-Barrett method (LBM) further relaxes the assumptions bedeviling traditional price
analysis methods and PBM, notably bidirectional trade and nonstationary costs of com-
merce. Moreover, the LBM permits distinction between market integration  and competitive
market equilibrium, two distinct concepts that are too often confused,  as we explain in
more detail in the next section. This analysis applies the LBM to a new, rich data set on
factor and product markets for the pork industries of several Pacific Rim economies.
Estimating Market Condition Frequencies
The LBM is an informationally richer model allowing more informative  and accurate
inference.  Its strength lies in its capacity  to use the information from  multiple data
sources to distinguish between related but distinct concepts of market equilibrium  and
1 Barrett (1996) presents a hierarchical  classification of markets analysis methods based on the nature of the data used.
Level I methods use only price data and are most susceptible to specification error. Level II methods combine price and trans-
actions cost data. Level II methods are relatively recent innovations  and represent the current frontier. Level III methods,
combining price, transactions costs, and trade flows data, were predicted to offer greater flexibility and inference. This paper
appears to be the first published work employing a level III method.
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market integration. The two are not synonymous in spite of current praxis. As Barrett
(1999) and Fackler and Goodwin  contend, the concept of market integration refers to
intermarket transfer ofWalrasian excess demand, as reflected in trade flows or, slightly
more broadly, to a product's tradability between two markets. Integration is a quantity-
based measure (e.g., is there spillover from one market to the next?) from which one can-
not reliably undertake inference about efficiency and welfare (e.g., are there unexploited
profits?). When two markets are integrated, supply and demand in the one market affect
the price and/or transactions volume in the other.
The observation of trade flows is therefore a sufficient statistic for integration. By this
definition, markets can be (imperfectly) integrated even when imperfectly competitive
or inefficiently restricted by trade barriers or collusion, and whether or not price in one
market responds (especially one-for-one)  to shocks in the other. Barrett (1999) argues
that this quantity-based  definition of market integration corresponds more closely to
popular understanding of the concept, and therefore helps economists communicate our
findings more clearly to intended end-users in industry and government.
This definition of market integration is less far-reaching than conventional measures
that rest on satisfaction of a zero marginal profit equilibrium condition and can there-
fore say something about efficiency and welfare. Following the familiar logic of compet-
itive  spatial  equilibrium  models,  two  markets  (i  and j)  are  in long-run  competitive
equilibrium, meaning that marginal profits to intermarket arbitrage equal zero, when
Pit < r(Pi,, Pj,,  cijt) + Pj,,  with Pi, the price at location i in time t, and T-  the transactions
costs of spatial arbitrage, which may be a function of prices (e.g., in the case of ad valorem
or variable rate tariffs or insurance) and the exogenous costs of transport between the
two locations  at time t,  ijt.
2
The  equilibrium condition binds with equality when trade occurs.  But when trade
does not  occur,  the constraint  may  be  slack,  so  there may  be no  correlation  among
market prices in spite of the existence of competitive equilibrium. 3 In contrast, if the
equilibrium condition binds with equality despite the absence of trade, then tradability
holds (i.e., the markets are integrated). Although trade flows are not observed, if the
marginal profit to spatial arbitrage is zero, traders should be indifferent as to whether
or not they undertake trade. This feature indicates that the product is tradable between
the two markets even if it is not traded. In that one circumstance,  market integration
obtains in the absence of observed trade flows because the broader concept of tradability
is still satisfied.
So the concept of market integration depends on the tradability of product between
two markets (for which recorded trade flows are sufficient but not necessary). The concept
of competitive spatial equilibrium,  on the other hand,  depends  on price, transactions
costs, and trade flow data in order to establish whether there exist unexploited positive
profits to arbitrage, whether arbitrage is a money-losing proposition, and whether price
differentials should track transactions costs exactly or be bounded from above by them.
2 Transport costs are treated as exogenous to traders' decisions,  as if shipment volumes didn't matter. The general equil-
ibrium effects of traders' decisions in the presence of economies  of scale in transport, perhaps manifest as nonlinear pricing,
merit some attention as well in follow-up work.
3 Goldberg and Knetter (p.  1245), reflecting the bulk of the literature,  claim that "[a]ny perfectly competitive  market is
characterized by the condition that price equals marginal cost. Therefore  a perfectly competitive market must be integrated."
The claim in the second sentence relies on the assumption of an interior solution, i.e., continuous tradability. When corner
solutions occur (as manifest by no trade), segmented equilibria are possible. Since trade can also occur without perfect compe-
tition (as in the case of binding quotas), equilibrium is neither necessary nor sufficient for integration, nor vice versa.
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When two markets are both integrated and in long-run competitive equilibrium, they
may be classified as "perfectly integrated." This is the special case on which the existing
market integration literature focuses.4 Tests of the law of one price (LOP), or of purchas-
ing power parity, or of cointegration between price series are implicitly tests of the more
restricted perfect integration hypothesis, not tests for (perhaps imperfectly competitive)
market integration or of (perhaps segmented) competitive equilibrium. The core reason
is that conventional market integration tests rely exclusively on price data, and so can-
not shed light on the quantity-based concept of market integration nor can they provide
reliable inferene on equilibrium conditions that depend as well on transactions cost and
trade flow data.
The LBM method we use here builds on Baulch's parity bounds model (PBM), which
compares  v  observed intermarket price differentials againsobserved costs of intermarket
transport, thereby estimating the probability that markets are in competitive equilibrium.
The PBM approach hurdles the problems of discontinuous trade and time-varying trans-
actions costs that bedevil pure price analysis methods. But because Baulch's method relies
on a single cross-sectional observation of transactions costs, subsequently deflated across
many periods, it imposes the assumption of stationarity on the costs of commerce.
Moreover, absent trade flow data, PBM still conflates the concepts of equilibrium and
integration. Price differentials  less than transfer costs are identified as "integration"
even when there is no flow of product and no transmission of price shocks between the
two markets. Not only do price differentials less than transfer costs not reflect market
integration if there is no product flow or price transmission,  but neither does such a
situation reflect long-run competitive market equilibrium if there are trade flows since
these generate  negative  profits  to arbitrage.  Conversely,  markets  are  classified  as
"segmented" whenever price differentials exceed transfer costs, regardless of whether
there are observed trade flows.
Since we can never observe all possible transactions costs involved in trade (e.g., sub-
jective risk premia, discount rates, quasi-option values), trade flow information can offer
indirect evidence of the effects of unobservable or omitted transactions costs, thereby
providing  additional  information  with which  to analyze  market relationships.  It  is
common, for example, to find that trade does (not) occur even when price differentials
are less than (exceed) transfer costs-defined as the observable portion of transactions
costs-implying that some unobservable effects (e.g., nontariff trade barriers, unmeasured
transactions costs, information gaps) exist and influence intermarket trade. If traders
are rational profit-maximizers,  trade  flow data convey additional  information  about
market integration beyond that offered by observable price and transfer cost data. So
it makes sense to exploit such data in markets analysis.
In keeping with the spatial equilibrium condition identified earlier, the Li-Barrett
method (LBM) therefore makes use of all three types of data: prices, transfer costs, and
trade flows.  This method  interprets the observed time-series  distribution of market
prices as a mixture of observations drawn from different distributional regimes corres-
ponding to distinct market conditions which may vary over time. There exist six distinct
market regimes. Trade  is either observed  (our odd-numbered  regimes) or not (our
even-numbered regimes). The existence of trade is sufficient to demonstrate integration.
4 Goldberg and Knetter provide an excellent recent review of this literature in the context of international trade. Fackler
and Goodwin offer a broader treatment of the spatial price analysis literature.
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Table 1.  The Six Intermarket Regimes
p7PI.  ,  p.  =  .P  P  . TP  P  < T.
Pi -j  Tji  Pi - Pj > Tji  P  - Pj < Ti
Trade  Perfect  Inefficient Integration  Inefficient Integration
Integration  (positive marginal  (negative marginal
with Trade  profits to arbitrage)  profits to arbitrage)
(X1)  (X 3)  ( 5)
No trade  Perfect Integration  Segmented  Segmented
without Trade  Disequilibrium  Equilibrium
(X2)  (X 4)  ()
Recall, too, that when trade is observed, price differentials should exactly equal transfer
costs in equilibrium,  so trade flow data help establish whether markets are in competi-
tive equilibrium. Price differentials may equal transfer costs (regimes 1 and 2), implying
binding arbitrage conditions and tradability, regardless of whether trade occurs or not.
Or price differentials may exceed transfer costs (regimes 3 and 4), implying the exist-
ence of positive marginal profits to intermarket arbitrage or unexploited profits in the
case of no-trade regime 4. Finally, when price differentials  do not fully cover transfer
costs (regimes  5 and 6), trade brings negative  profit  to arbitrageurs,  inducing a no-
trade segmented  equilibrium in the case of regime  6.  Letting Pi and Pj be the prices
in locations i andj, respectively,  Tji be the observable transfer costs from j to i, and
=lXk =1,  the six regimes are summarized in table 1.
In estimating the probability of observing the kth regime  (Xk),  we have only partial
information: the binary observation of  trade or no trade. So we estimate a mixture model,
maximizing the likelihood associated with the regime frequencies found in the sample,
conditional on knowing whether trade occurs  or not and the distribution assumption
made  about  the measurement  errors  associated  with  each  regime.  We  assume  all
regimes are subject to i.i.d. normal sampling and measurement error, vt, with zero mean
and variance  o2.  Regimes 3-6 also include a one-sided  error, ut, that is independent of
Vt and is i.i.d. half-normal with variance  o2. The half-normal error is added to (subtract-
ed from) Tji + vt for regimes 3 and 4 (5 and 6). Using the density of the sum of a normal
random variable and a truncated normal random variable (Weinstein), the distribution
functions for the observations in each regime are:
a(1)  ftl=~2  1  [IYt-T ] (1)  sf  f;  =T  a4  '  [  ]
(2)  f 3= f-  2[0±O/4  2  |  T  - -(Yt  - T)a/av (2)  f;.ff.' 
2 1'^  - -^D"
and
$  6  - +2 f+  :i-  T  |  ((ot - Td)aa] (3)  f  f  2  =  g 2  2  _½
(;2  ±  02)  2/2  2(  2 )2  (o02  + 0)/2
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where T, and Y, are intermarket transfer costs and price differentials, respectively, at
time t, ( is the standard normal density function, and 1 is the standard normal cumula-
tive distribution function.
The likelihood of observing the sample price, transfer cost, and trade data can there-
fore be written:
T
(4)  L=  7  {A  {[lft  +  3f  +  sft ]  + (1  -A) .[X 2 ft2  .f4  + X6ff]},
t=l
where A is a dummy variable for the occurrence of trade: A = 1 if trade is observed and
A =  0 otherwise. The probabilities of each regime  and the variances  (2  and o2 can be
estimated by maximizing the logarithm of equation (4), subject to the constraints that
k  > O V k, and  kXk =  1.5 The  % 2 parameter estimates reflect the width of the confidence
band surrounding the parity bounds, and therefore reflect the precision with which one
can estimate satisfaction of the zero marginal profit equilibrium  condition. Estimates
of XA  and X 2 should therefore not be interpreted as measures of the probability that price
differentials exactly equal transfer costs, but rather of the probability that the two are
equal up to a zero mean Gaussian error having variance  oV.
This method permits construction of several useful indicators of the frequency with
which particular market conditions prevail. Intermarket tradability  (X1  +  2 + i3 + X 5)
occurs whenever trade is observed or the intermarket arbitrage condition is binding, so
that traders are indifferent between trading or not. Competitive equilibrium  (3X  + a  + a6)
occurs whenever the intermarket arbitrage (zero marginal trader profit) condition holds.
Two markets are thus  perfectly integrated  with frequency (,  + X3), inefficiently integrated
with frequency (X3 l  +  5), in segmented equilibrium with frequency  6, and in segmented
disequilibrium (neither integrated  nor in long-run  competitive  equilibrium)  with
frequency X 4. These conditions describe essentially all market conditions of interest to
economists and their business and trade policy clients.
The regimes of most concern to economists are typically those reflecting violations of
long-run competitive equilibrium. In regime 3, trade occurs and appears to earn positive
marginal profits. This implies either (a) insufficient market arbitrage, due perhaps to
formal or informal nontariff trade barriers or to temporary  disequilibria  (e.g., due to
informational or contracting lags) that generate rents, or (b) the existence of significant
unmeasured transactions  costs that fill in the gap between the price differential  and
observable transfer costs (e.g., for quality assurance, certification for meeting importing
country sanitary and phytosanitary standards,  risk premia,  or information costs).  In
regime  4,  apparent  positive  profits  go wholly unexploited  by traders.  The plausible
explanations for this observation are the same as for regime 3, but the behavioral effect
is extreme.  Parallel logic holds in regime 5,  where transfer costs exceed  price differ-
entials yet trade occurs despite negative estimated marginal profits. This may be due
either to temporary disequilibria (e.g., due to information and contracting lags) or to the
existence of significant unobservable transactions benefits (e.g., first-mover advantages)
accruing to traders.
While price differentials are symmetric (in absolute value) between any two markets,
intermarket transfer costs (Tt) commonly depend on the direction of trade since tariffs
5 Baulch's  PBM is a special case of our model that applies when there is no variation in trading  status (i.e., A =  1 in all
periods or A = 0 in all periods), in which case the only available information  comes from price and transfer cost data.
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vary across countries and backhaul freight rates are sometimes lower than the standard
freight rates going the opposite direction. Asymmetric transfer costs imply the need to
estimate direction-specific regime probabilities,  i.e., one vector (X3')  related to product
moving from market i to marketj, and a second vector (Xji)  related to movements in the
opposite direction. In general, X_  - Xji ￿  0, meaning there will not be a unique probability
vector describing both integration and equilibrium between two distinct markets since
direction-specific regime probabilities may differ.
This is not a problem for measures oftradability, since tradability is inherently a uni-
directional concept. A product is tradable between two markets when it can or does flow
from either one  to the other.  Bidirectional tradability is unnecessary  for there to  be
transmission of Walrasian excess demand between markets.
By contrast, equilibrium is an omnidirectional concept. If  there exist positive marginal
profits going either direction, potential Pareto improvements exist. So one really needs
to know if spatial equilibrium conditions obtain in both directions. The existence of non-
tariff trade barriers (e.g., quotas or regulatory barriers) in one country can easily lead
to equilibrium in one direction (into the open market) but disequilibrium in the other
direction (into the restricted market).
Since tradability and perfect integration are unidirectional concepts, we therefore use
the maximal direction-specific values of intermarket tradability and perfect integration
in describing those market conditions between two (prospective) trading partners.6 But
since equilibrium is an omnidirectional concept, we use the bounds created by the two
direction-specific results in describing the frequency of spatial market equilibrium. The
width of that band is itself suggestive of the underlying efficiency of arbitrage between
the markets.
Finally, we should point out that the LBM estimator handles only bilateral rela-
tionships.  It  does  not take account of likely correlations  between  various market
pairs for a given commodity  (e.g., nontariff barriers in place in country  1 apply to
imports  from either country  2 or country  3),  nor does it  exploit likely correlations
between various products for a given market pair (e.g., an embargo on pork affects
each cut simultaneously). Generalization of the LBM procedure into a full information
maximum-likelihood approach is conceptually appealing but rather difficult in practice,
given the multidimensional boundaries on the parameter space in these models and the
need to then make further arbitrary assumptions about the nature of the joint distri-
butions between various regimes across products and/or markets. Since oversight of the
likely correlations merely reduces efficiency but does not introduce bias or inconsistency,
we leave this task as an interesting future extension.
Pacific Rim Pork Industry Markets Data
We assembled comparable monthly time-series data on prices, trade flows, and estimated
intermarket transactions costs over the years 1990-96 for eight commodities from eight
countries. The commodities consisted of feedgrains (corn and soybean meal), slaughter
hogs, chilled carcass, and chilled pork cuts (bellies, hams, loins, ribs). 7 The eight countries
6 Equivalently, the minima are the most appropriate estimates for market segmentation between a pair of markets
(X4  +  X 6).
7 Since the mid-1980s, chilled meats have overtaken frozen meats in international commerce,  apparently because con-
sumers prefer the quality of chilled over frozen meat.
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included Australia,  Canada, Japan,  Korea,  Mexico, the Philippines,  Taiwan, and the
United States. We are unaware of any other study that uses either such comprehensive
time-series  data  on  the  costs  of commerce  or  trade  data  combined  with  price  and
transfer cost data. This section explains the data series, but greater detail is available
in Barrett et al.
It  would be hard to overstate either how painstaking was the process of compiling
reasonably  comparable  product-level  time  series  or  how ultimately imperfect  these
measures are. We began by collecting price series at monthly frequency for products as
homogeneous as we could find. Thus we can be as precise  as yellow #2 corn (although
the grade distinction is not made in either the Philippines  or Taiwan),  48% protein
soybean meal, 90-120 kilogram barrows  and gilts, skinless fresh bellies,  etc.
Nonetheless, the price series are not perfectly comparable because definitions differ
slightly across countries (e.g., Mexico reports prices of fresh back ribs, while the other
countries report prices for spare ribs), timing and aggregation  differ across countries
(e.g., belly prices in Mexico  are the average of the weekly highest frequency prices, in
Canada they are the average of Saturday prices, and in Taiwan they are the average of
three three-day periods per month), and level in the marketing channel (quasi-farmgate,
wholesale,  or retail,  although  most  of the  series  are  wholesale).  Local  prices  were
converted into U.S. dollars using monthly average exchange rates. So there is a certain
amount of uncontrollable measurement error in the intermarket price differentials used
in estimation.  Insofar as measurement errors are symmetric and random, they should
be picked up by the error term ()  that defines the width of  t  he  width of the parity bounds relating
price differentials  and measured transactions costs.
Trade flow  data  were gathered  from  published  customs  data for Canada,  Japan,
Taiwan, and the United States. The customs classifications are typically not as precise
as the product definitions  in the price  series. For example, rather than 48%  soybean
meal, the most disaggregated level of trade data just refer to soy flour and meal. The
likely main  effect  of this modest  disjuncture  is to introduce  some aggregation  bias
manifest as bidirectional trade in what are actually imperfectly homogeneous products,
possibly leading to some upward bias in estimates of market integration if the frequency
of trade is overstated due to aggregation  of several products.
Next we estimated transfer costs as the sum of domestic transport costs, international
freight charges, insurance  and loading/offloading  costs, and any applicable tariffs. As
a result, our transfer cost series are higher, more variable, and more complete than the
transport  cost series available  from the International  Wheat  Council, the Baltic Ex-
change, or the U.S. Department of Agriculture/Agricultural Marketing Service's (USDA/
AMS') Ocean Freight  Rate Report. If transfer costs other than transport charges (e.g.,
insurance or ad valorem tariffs)  are correlated  with the underlying price  series, our
more comprehensive  measures  obviate statistical problems  of simultaneity bias that
may plague even those other studies that have attempted to account for transport costs,
much less those that use only price data.
Domestic transport costs were constructed by identifying precisely the location from
which each national price series was gathered (e.g., Omaha for U.S. hogs and pork, or
Decatur for U.S. soybean meal) and computing the cost of moving the product from this
site to Pacific  Coast ports (usually Seattle) using truck, rail, or barge  costs kindly
provided  by the Agricultural  Marketing  Service. We  were unsuccessful  in obtaining
analogous series for Canada or Mexico, and so imputed domestic transport costs to the
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coast for these series using the U.S. rates per kilometer-metric ton. Insofar as Canada
subsidized interprovincial freight costs for some of these products during much of the
period, this likely introduces some upward bias in transfer costs with respect to Canada.
It  should not be an issue for products for which the Canadian price  series  are from
British Columbia (e.g., carcasses and slaughter hogs), but will be relevant for the other
products. The Australian and Asian price  series are  all at port or port regions, so we
ignore any domestic transport in those countries.
International freight, insurance, and loading/offloading (CIF) costs were derived from
U.S. customs data tapes on U.S. imports for specific products.  We took arithmetic
averages across all ports of entry in the case of shipments from Canada and Mexico, and
across Pacific ports of entry in the case o  the Australasian countries. Since CIF costs
are not available for U.S. exports, we assume symmetry for a given product and route
(e.g., nontariff costs for hams from the U.S. to Canada equal to those for hams from
Canada to the U.S.), ignoring the possibility of differences between forward and back-
haul rates or insurance. Since the U.S. does not import each of these commodities from
each  country  studied,  we  sometimes  had to  proxy using  similar  commodities  or
neighboring countries (e.g., costs of importing lamb from Australia as a proxy for costs
of importing pork from Australia). Canadian nontariff CIF costs to and from Asia were
assumed identical to costs to and from Seattle since Vancouver is the primary Canadian
port for this trade.
The final component of the transfer cost series is tariffs.8 These were computed on an
average kilogram basis based on the prevailing trade volume (where a tariff rate quota
system was in place) using published ad valorem and specific tariff schedules collected
from consulates and the U.S. Department of Commerce. All changes in tariffs during the
study period are thus fully reflected in the transfer cost series used.
Data are not available for precisely the same periods across countries or commodities.
Indeed, data are not available on some commodities for some countries. So the number
of observations vary across commodity-specific country pairs, and the number of country
pairs available differ among commodities in the estimation results that follow.
Data Characteristics and Estimation Results
Our data show the standard assumptions  of constant, trivial transactions  costs and
continuous trade frequently do not hold. Under such conditions, inference becomes unre-
liable in conventional price analysis methods based on correlation coefficients, Granger
causality, cointegration testing, and error correction mechanisms (Barrett 1996,  1999;
McNew;  Baulch;  McNew  and  Fackler).  For  example, trade  discontinuity  implies  a
nonlinear or piecewise linear relationship between price series, and bidirectional trade
implies product differentiation, variation in direction of flow (implying the estimated
sign of -r, the transactions cost term in the linear spatial equilibrium model, implicitly
switches between negative and positive), or both. Yet continuous, unidirectional trade
characterizes less than 6% of the commodity-specific market pairs for which we gathered
data. This assumption holds  only for trade  in primal  pork cuts between  Japan and
8 Quota rents are not added to transfer costs in our model. State trading regimes that significantly  but implicitly tax or
subsidize exports  are also ignored because we use domestic  prices and international trading costs, with no adjustment for
distortionary  pricing (whether of the product or of shipping services) by state trading companies.
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Taiwan. And since we could not collect reliable transfer cost series between Japan and
Taiwan, not one of the 88 commodity-specific market pairs to which we apply LBM fully
satisfies the trade flow and transfer cost assumptions on which conventional methods
rest. Hence the rationale is supported for using LBM to obviate the statistical hazards
of traditional price analysis techniques.
Discontinuous trade or trade flow reversals frequently arise due to perturbations in
the costs of market arbitrage, including trade policy reforms. Our data show that transfer
costs are time-varying and that ad valorem tariffs and graduated insurance or freight
schedules generate a nontrivial positive correlation between the measured transfer cost
and price  series, so omission of the transfer costs likely leads to simultaneity bias in
parameter estimates  derived from pure price analysis techniques.  Moreover,  transfer
costs are frequently substantial, nonstationary, or both.
Figures  1 and 2  present histograms  depicting the frequency distribution  of mean
transfer  cost to export country domestic price ratios for commodity-  and direction-
specific market pairs, respectively. These ratios represent the mean proportional mark-
up necessary to break even on shipments from the exporting country to the importing
country. Predictably,  transfer costs tend to be greatest as a proportion of price for low
value-to-weight commodities  (i.e., feedgrains) and for longer distances traveled. Mean
transfer costs were only 1.8% of export country domestic price for intra-North American
trade in chilled pork products, but averaged  221% of export country domestic  price for
trans-Pacific trade in feedgrains.
What is perhaps most striking is that the direction of trade often matters, too. Mean
transfer costs are considerably higher going from North America to Asia than vice versa
(figure 2) due to differences  in tariff rates since we assume symmetry in the nontariff
component of transfer costs. For example, Japanese tariffs alone on live slaughter hogs
averaged  39% of the U.S.  domestic price.  Similarly,  while transfer  costs for loins
averaged but 1.4% of export price going from Canada to the United States or vice versa,
and only 6%  (6.1%) from Japan to Canada (the U.S.), transfer costs averaged  121.6%
(192.5%) of export price going the opposite direction across the Pacific, from Canada (the
United States) to Japan! 9 Trade policy clearly matters as much as transport costs, yet
has been largely ignored in the market integration studies we have found.10
Given secular trends toward liberalized trade through permanently lower tariff  rates,
it is intuitive that many international transfer cost time series should be nonstation-
ary.11Indeed, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests find that 12 of 14 feedgrains' transfer cost
series  are  nonstationary;  more  precisely,  one  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of
nonstationarity at the  90% significance  level.l2 Transfer costs from North America to
Japan are nonstationary for each commodity  over the 1990-96 period. This observed
9  During the period 1990-96,  Canada imposed no tariffs on imported pork or slaughter hogs. The United States imposed
a specific duty of 2.20 per kilogram on primal pork cuts, but no duty on carcasses or slaughter hogs. Pork from Canada to the
United States became duty free under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),  placed into effect in January
1994 by Presidential  Proclamation 6641 of December  15, 1993. Taiwan imposed a 15% (10%) ad valorem duty on pork and
carcasses  (on slaughter hogs). Japan employed a more complex variable rate schedule under which specific duties apply over
some ranges, ad valorem tariffs over others, all tied to variable trigger prices.
10  In contrast,  trade economists  tend to study the effects of policy-related barriers to international  commerce  without
explicitly checking whether competitive equilibrium holds between markets.
n There is also evidence that macroeconomic shocks may also add to international trade costs through their effects on the
incidence of sea piracy, which occurs disproportionately in Asian waters and has risen sharply in the wake of the East Asian
crisis (Sullivan and Jordan).
12 Detailed test results are available from the authors by request.
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Figure 2.  Transfer cost proportions by geography of trade
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nonstationarity in measured  transfer  cos  ts likely  reflects  three  structural  changes.
First, there have been  significant  improvements in  shipping technologies  that have
given rise to steady reductions in real transport costs per ton-mile, so the mean transfer
cost has been  changing  over  time.  Second,  energy  costs  are  an important factor  in
shipping costs and there were several sharp, persistent movements in oil prices during
the  1990-96  period.  Third,  although  reforms  under  the World  Trade  Organization
(WTO) did not go into effect in these markets during the period under study, there were
other changes in tariff policy (for example, Japan's switch from its "differential tariff"
system to a "gate price" system in 1995).
Transfer costs for meat and live hogs were more commonly stationary than those for
feedgrains, probably due to the relatively smaller role of tariff reduction in these com-
modities since many animal product trade restrictions ae nontariff technical barriers
that have been less subject to liberalization to date (Hillman; Thilmany and Barrett).
With agricultural trade liberalization expected to feature prominently in the next round
of multilateral  WTO negotiations,  this issue is unlikely to disappear any time soon.
Thus market analysts must adopt methods better suited to the underlying conditions
of international trade and its associated  costs.
Table 2 presents the LBM estimation results, several of which stand out. First, loss-
making trade (X 5) is extremely uncommon, occurring at 10% or greater frequency in only
3/88 cases, all in soybean meal trade involving Japan. Few traders appear willing to
absorb losses, even temporarily, in order to maintain or expand market share. Instead,
segmented equilibrium (- 6) prevails  91.5% of the time when price  differentials  are
insufficient to cover observable market intermediation costs, as in just over one-quarter
of all these commodity-,  direction-, and period-specific observations.13
Recall from figures 1 and 2 that transfer costs are often considerably greater than the
f.o.b. export price. Segmented equilibrium is to be expected in the face of large wedges
driven between markets' prices by tariffs,  shipping costs, or both. While comparative
disadvantage  manifested  as segmented  equilibrium  never occurs  with  positive and
statistically significant probability for either U.S. or Canadian producers of these eight
commodities, it occurs for half  the primal cuts from Taiwan, two-thirds from Mexico, and
all the meat (cuts and carcass) from Japan. In general, the comparative  disadvantage of
Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, and Taiwan in feedgrains, hogs, and pork is appar-
ent from the asymmetric frequency with which those source markets are in segmented
equilibrium from the Canadian and United States markets. Production and processing
costs are much higher in those countries, leading to higher domestic prices and frequent
imports (when not impeded by trade barriers) from Canada and the United States.
Second, segmented disequilibrium (X 4), where no trade occurs in spite of the apparent
existence of positive profits, likewise appears rarely-only 3%  of the time overall, and
with 5%  or greater frequency in only three cases: bellies and loins from the U.S. into
Taiwan, and slaughter hogs from the U.S. into Canada. This likely reflects the fact that
trade in higher-value-added  products and live animals tends to be most subject to
nontariff trade barriers, and that few such barriers fully prohibit trade. The observation
that unprofitable trade or segmented disequilibrium occurs only 5% of the time is strong
empirical confirmation of the profit-making behavior of international traders operating
in these markets.
13 This comparison is made by dividing the point estimate by the sum of the estimates across a category [e.g., X 5/(X 5+ L6)]-
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Table 2.  LBM Estimation Results
TRADE  No TRADE  Std. Errors Direction
of Trade  1  3  a  2  4  6  (U  V
Bellies:
US - CA  1.00*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.158  0.986
CA,  US  0.99*  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.121  1.236
US  TW  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.98*  0.00  1.264  0.039
TW -US  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.98*  4.202  0.465
US  MX  0.01*  0.98*  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  3.095  0.469
MX  US  0.01*  0.01*  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.97*  3.114  0.496
CA -TW  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.99*  0.00  0.00  0.427  0.492
TW  CA  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.97*  2.105  3.140
Hams:
US -CA  0.98*  0.01*  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.517  0.055
CA -US  0.89*  0.04  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.00  0.284  0.024
US  TW  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.99*  0.01  0.00  0.996  1.004
TW -US  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.99*  1.785  1.495
PH  US  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.98*  0.00  0.00  0.002  0.847
US -PH  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.99*  0.00  0.00  0.053  0.737
CA -TW  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.99*  0.00  0.00  1.347  0.769
TW - CA  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.98*  0.381  0.646
Loins:
US -CA  0.99*  0.00  0.01*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.058  0.681
CA -US  0.99*  0.00  0.01*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.677  0.665
JP  US  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.99*  0.179  1.944
US - JP  0.01*  0.98*  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  1.217  1.540
CA -TW  0.01*  0.00  0.00  0.99*  0.00  0.00  1.107  1.221
TW - CA  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.99*  0.00  0.00  1.726  2.094
JP -CA  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.98*  1.734  0.393
CA -JP  0.01  0.98*  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  1.193  0.244
US  MX  0.01*  0.98*  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.448  0.290
MX - US  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.98*  0.451  0.445
US -TW  0.01  0.21*  0.00  0.01  0.77*  0.00  1.554  0.168
TW -US  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.97*  0.00  0.00  4.554  1.748
Spareribs:
US - CA  0.10  0.89*  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.265  0.083
CA -US  0.41*  0.02  0.00  0.56*  0.01  0.00  0.000  0.466
CA - TW  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.99*  0.00  0.00  0.000  0.585
TW-  CA  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.98*  0.00  0.00  0.778  2.524
US  MX  0.01  0.98*  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.934  0.588
MX -US  0.01*  0.01  0.00  0.99  0.00  0.00  0.482  1.130
US -TW  0.20*  0.01*  0.00  0.78*  0.01  0.00  0.000  0.504
TW -US  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.97*  0.00  0.00  0.005  0.279
Carcasses:
US - CA  0.14*  0.00  0.00  0.86*  0.00  0.00  0.578  0.330
CA-  US  0.98*  0.01*  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.165  0.139
( continued...)
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Table 2.  Continued
TRADE  NO TRADE  Std. Errors
Direction













































































































US -CA  0.96*  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.180  0.095
CA -US  0.65*  0.04  0.01  0.29*  0.01  0.00  0.000  0.103
US -TW  0.31*  0.01  0.00  0.67*  0.01  0.00  0.000  0.229
TW - US  0.01*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.99*  0.458  0.431
US  PH  0.20*  0.00  0.00  0.80*  0.00  0.00  3.825  0.659
PH -US  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.98*  0.433  0.477
CA  TW  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.99*  0.00  0.00  4.611  0.230
TW -> CA  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.97*  0.01  0.00  0.701  0.012
CA - PH  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.99*  0.00  0.00  0.000  0.853
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Table 2.  Continued
TRADE  No TRADE  Std. Errors Direction
of Trade a  1  3  2  34  Gu  oV
Soybean Meal:
US-  CA  0.91*  0.01  0.06*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.195  0.018
CA -US  0.88*  0.00  0.00  0.12*  0.00  0.00  0.324  0.077
TW-,  CA  0.53*  0.02  0.01  0.41*  0.02  0.01  0.000  0.359
CA -TW  0.22*  0.00  0.00  0.78*  0.00  0.00  0.368  0.207
CA -JP  0.01  0.17  0.82*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.013  0.088
JP -CA  0.77*  0.01*  0.01  0.01*  0.01*  0.19*  0.415  0.475
US  JP  0.14  0.33*  0.34*  0.18*  0.01  0.00  0.000  0.065
JP -US  0.01*  0.01  0.39*  0.01*  0.01  0.57*  0.000  0.513
US -TW  0.52*  0.00  0.00  0.48*  0.00  0.00  0.184  0.030
TW -US  0.01*  0.01*  0.09*  0.01  0.01*  0.87*  6.855  0.386
Notes: An asterisk (*)  denotes statistically significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. Due
to rounding errors, rows do not always sum to one.
"AU = Australia,  CA = Canada, JP = Japan, KO = Korea, MX = Mexico, PH = Philippines, TW = Taiwan,
and US = United States.
Segmented disequilibrium and inefficient integration with positive apparent profits
(X 3) are most likely the consequence of nontariff barriers to trade (e.g., quotas, sanitary
and phytosanitary  restrictions,  and private  or public technical  barriers) that create
positive rents to trade by restricting the free flow of commodities between nations. Such
rents exist about  11%  of the time overall in these markets, but with more than 22%
frequency in the case of primal cuts (bellies, hams, loins, and spareribs). This reflects
the relatively greater propensity for nontariff barriers to apply to higher-value-added,
processed products, like chilled meats, than to raw commodities,  like corn, for which
X 3 + X 5 occurred with only  1.5% frequency.  Significantly positive estimates for x3 or X 4
appear almost exclusively for imports into Japan, Mexico,  and Taiwan, reflecting the
relatively great propensity of those three countries to employ nontariff trade barriers. 1 4
In several cases the X2estimates-for the no trade equilibrium within the parity
bounds-appear rather high. This seems attributable to large standard errors (aO) on
those particular estimates, and probably comes at the cost of lower estimates of X 6, the
segmented equilibrium. We therefore suspect the estimates reported here overstate the
frequency with which bidirectional tradability holds and, equivalently, understate the
frequency with which Canadian and U.S. producers and processors exhibit comparative
advantage over their counterparts  in the other six economies.  Overestimates of x2 at
the expense  of underestimates  of X 6 have  no effect, however,  on the point estimates
for satisfaction of either competitive spatial equilibrium or (unidirectional) intermarket
tradability.
Tables  3-5  offer  summary descriptions  of the estimated frequencies  of particular
market conditions prevailing. The most striking result is that intermarket tradability
14Of course, these results might also be partly attributable to subtle noncomparability of cuts that makes intermarket
price comparison  difficult.
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Table 3.  Estimates of Intermarket Condition Frequencies for Canada
Perfect Market  Intermarket  Market
Integration  Tradability  Equilibrium
Product  Other Market  (X 1 +  2)  +  3 +  X5)  (X 1 + 2  + X 6)
Bellies  Taiwan  0.99  0.99  (0.98,  0.99)
United States  1.00  1.00  (0.99,  1.00)
Hams  Taiwan  1.00  1.00  (0.99,  1.00)
United States  0.98  1.00  (0.94,  0.98)
Loins  Japan  0.01  0.99  (0.01,  0.99)
Taiwan  1.00  1.00  (1.00,  1.00)
United States  0.99  1.00  (0.99,  0.99)
Spareribs  Taiwan  1.00  1.00  (0.99,  1.00)
United States  0.97  1.00  (0.11,  0.97)
Carcasses  Japan  0.98  0.99  (0.98,  0.99)
United States  1.00  1.00  (0.99,  1.00)
Slaughter Hogs  Australia  0.99  1.00  (0.97,  0.99)
Korea  0.99  1.00  (0.99,  0.99)
Philippines  1.00  1.00  (0.95,  1.00)
Taiwan  0.99  0.99  (0.99,  0.99)
United States  0.99  1.00  (0.31,  0.99)
Corn  Philippines  1.00  1.00  (0.94,  1.00)
Taiwan  1.00  1.00  (0.97,  1.00)
United States  0.96  0.99  (0.94,  0.96)
Soybean Meal  Japan  0.78  1.00  (0.01,  0.97)
Taiwan  1.00  1.00  (0.95,  1.00)
United States  1.00  1.00  (0.91,  1.00)
is effectively ubiquitous,  occurring with at least 99% frequency in 42/44  commodity-
specific market pairs. There is no question that the factor and product markets of Pacific
Rim pork industries are integrated in the sense of tradability.
The LBM estimation results also underscore the distinction between tradability and
equilibrium. While equilibrium prevails with at least 96% frequency in 43/44 commodity-
and direction-specific market pairs (i.e., the upper bound on market equilibrium is at
least 96%), disequilibrium commonly appears in one direction. Given the unidirectional
nature of disequilibrium,  we find it  hard to believe that this  could reflect imperfect
competition,  save for that generated by nontariff barriers that generate quota rents.
Moreover, when compared against evidence on nontariff barriers to trade (e.g., Roberts
and DeRemer), there is a strong correspondence between the observation of reasonably
frequent disequilibrium in our estimates and the existence of unilateral nontariff trade
barriers, mostly by Japan and Mexico, but also (for a couple of  products only) for Canada
and Taiwan. For the limited range of products under study here, Australia, Korea, and
the Philippines appear relatively unfettered by nontariff barriers or imperfect compe-
tition impeding attainment of competitive  market equilibrium.
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Table 4.  Estimates of Intermarket Condition Frequencies for the U.S.
Perfect Market  Intermarket  Market
Integration  Tradability  Equilibrium
Product  Other Market  (X 1 + X 2)  (2  +  2 + 3  +  X5)  (X 1 + X 2 + X 6)
Bellies  Canada  1.00  1.00  (0.99,  1.00)
Mexico  0.02  1.00  (0.02,  0.99)
Taiwan  0.01  0.01  (0.01,  0.99)
Hams  Canada  0.98  1.00  (0.94,  0.98)
Philippines  1.00  1.00  (0.99,  1.00)
Taiwan  0.99  0.99  (0.99,  1.00)
Loins  Canada  0.99  1.00  (0.99,  0.99)
Japan  0.02  1.00  (0.02,  0.99)
Mexico  0.02  1.00  (0.02,  1.00)
Taiwan  0.98  0.99  (0.02,  0.98)
Spareribs  Canada  0.97  1.00  (0.11,  0.97)
Mexico  1.00  1.00  (0.01,  1.00)
Taiwan  0.98  0.99  (0.98,  0.98)
Carcasses  Australia  1.00  1.00  (1.00,  1.00)
Canada  1.00  1.00  (0.99,  1.00)
Japan  0.99  1.00  (0.97,  0.99)
Korea  0.98  0.99  (0.98,  0.98)
Slaughter Hogs  Australia  1.00  1.00  (0.98,  1.00)
Canada  0.99  1.00  (0.31,  0.99)
Korea  1.00  1.00  (1.00,  1.00)
Philippines  0.99  1.00  (0.99,  0.99)
Taiwan  0.99  0.99  (0.99,  0.99)
Corn  Canada  0.96  0.99  (0.94,  0.96)
Philippines  1.00  1.00  (0.99,  1.00)
Taiwan  0.98  0.99  (0.98,  1.00)
Soybean Meal  Canada  1.00  1.00  (0.91,  1.00)
Japan  0.32  0.99  (0.32,  0.59)
Taiwan  1.00  1.00  (0.89,  1.00)
Equilibrium nonetheless prevails at least two-thirds of the time in all products, and
effectively continuously in carcass, corn, and ham markets. The intersection oftradability
and equilibrium,  constant perfect market integration (X1  + X 2 = 1), holds in only  17/44
market pairs. Traditional price analysis methods implicitly test only for constant perfect
market integration.  Given that traditional methods' rejection of the null hypothesis of
efficient market integration cannot be disentangled from rejection of the assumptions
imposed in their model specification, we take this finding as a strong indication that the
mass of empirical evidence against spatial market equilibrium (i.e., rejecting the law of
one price) probably reflects specification error at least as much as it reflects significant
impediments to the functioning of  competitive international agricultural markets. Hence
there is clearly a need to move toward informationally richer methods of market analysis.
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Table 5.  Mean Estimates of Intermarket  Condition Frequencies by Product
Perfect Market  Intermarket  Market
Integration  Tradability  Equilibrium
Product  (ai  + A 2)  (iL +  X2 + X3 + A 5)  (1  + X2 +  X6)
Bellies  0.50  0.75  0.75
Hams  0.99  1.00  0.99
Loins  0.50  0.99  0.67
Spareribs  0.99  1.00  0.76
Carcasses  0.99  1.00  0.99
Slaughter Hogs  0.98  1.00  0.94
Corn  0.99  1.00  0.98
Soybean Meal  0.82  1.00  0.76
Notes:  The first two numeric columns are the unweighted arithmetic means of the maximal direction-specific
estimate from each country pair. The last column is the unweighted arithmetic mean of the direction-specific
estimates.
Conclusions  and Extensions
This analysis applies a new approach to the study of spatial market relationships using
maximum-likelihood  estimation  of a mixture distribution model incorporating  price,
transfer cost, and trade flow data. This method generates intuitive and useful indicators
of the frequency of intermarket tradability, competitive market equilibrium, perfect
market integration (a tradable competitive  equilibrium), segmented equilibrium,  and
segmented disequilibrium. Moreover, the approach employed here, unlike conventional
market analysis methods, is robust to time-varying, nonstationary, or nonadditive trans-
fer costs and to discontinuous or bidirectional trade, conditions that commonly prevail
in the eight Pacific Rim commodity markets we study.
The estimation results yield a number of important findings with respect to the factor
and product markets of  Pacific Rim pork industries. First, these products are highly trad-
able among the eight economies we study. Market integration is nearly ubiquitous and
constant. Second, spatial equilibrium holds significantly more often than not, although
there remain a number of niches where the marginal profits to spatial arbitrage remain
positive, largely reflecting binding nontariff barriers to trade, particularly those imposed
by Japan and Mexico. Third, while spatial equilibrium is commonplace, in many cases
that is attributable  to large intermarket transfer costs that drive a substantial wedge
between market prices, effectively segmenting markets. High tariffs, typically by Asian
importing countries, account for a large share of these measurable transactions costs.
So continued tariff reduction would no doubt increase trade (although not necessarily
the frequency with which spatial market equilibrium  holds)  and reduce deadweight
losses associated with trade restrictions.
A number of important extensions can be made to the model presented here. One is
methodological.  One could exploit the likely correlation  among products  and trading
partners to generate more precise estimates of regime frequencies. Given the relatively
large values of many of the  ov estimates  of the width of the parity bounds, this might
help pin down integration and segmentation frequencies with much greater precision,
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although it would be unlikely to affect the estimated frequency with which competitive
spatial equilibrium obtains.
Another important extension is historical. To what extent are there structural breaks
in the relationships  between national markets for particular products? With respect to
policy reforms involving changes in tariff rates or other measurable costs, our method
already accounts for them. But in the past few years (largely after our study period of
1990-96),  there  have  been  concerted  efforts  to reduce  nontariff barriers  (including
through tariffication, e.g., the conversion of quotas to tariff rate qutas) while there have
also been increased concerns about the introduction of regulatory barriers to trade as
a backlash against tariff reduction (Thilmany and Barrett). Rather than just estimating
unconditional period averages for the various market regimes, it might be interesting
to look at the intertemporal pattern of such measures using rolling bandwidth estimates
or statistical tests for structural breaks.
Finally, an important implicit message of this work is the value of improved inference
made possible by better information on prices, trade flows, and the costs of international
commerce. As analysts increasingly recognize the importance of incorporating data on
transfer costs and trade flows in market analysis, we hope that government statistical
agencies will begin to invest in generating regular, reliable, and internationally compar-
able series. The short, imperfect, and incomplete series we generated enable the use of
informationally richer models offering more interesting and more accurate  inference.
The profession's capacity to make significant advances in international market analysis
depends fundamentally on the availability of such data series.
[Received August 1999; final revision received February 2000.]
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